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Paul G. Mahoneyt
Harvey Pitt and Karen Shapiro present a comprehensive review
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulatory and
enforcement activities during the past decade' and discuss the use of
ex post enforcement actions as a means of controlling the behavior of
market participants. They note several dangers inherent in the use
of enforcement actions to regulate behavior, such as the absence of
sufficiently precise definitions of the prohibited activities and the lack
of procedural safeguards associated with the formal rulemaking
process Because Pitt and Shapiro generally support comprehensive
regulation of the financial markets, however, they stop short of
raising a more fundamental concern-that the use of enforcement
actions to define prohibited conduct short-circuits debate over
whether the conduct should be regulated at all.
In the United States, because the Securities, and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is generally perceived as a model regulatory
agency' and perhaps because there has been no repeat of the
economic conditions that led to the adoption of the federal securities
laws, there has been little debate over the structure of securities
regulation-a debate that, in this author's view, is long overdue. As
the securities markets become increasingly international, however,
that debate may take place on a global stage, with the SEC's view
being only one of many, and the outcome not necessarily the
triumph of the American model.4 As the flow of investment across
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national borders has increased, the SEC has sought to avoid such a
conflict by arguing that more uniform regulation of international
markets would benefit investors. It is clear,' moreover, that the
uniform system the SEC advocates is one patterned on the American
model.
Pitt and Shapiro treat these efforts to achieve convergence of
regulatory approaches as a sensible development unrelated to their
broader theme of regulation by enforcement.' The two phenomena
are related, however, and are likely to become more so. In the
international context, the SEC faces genuine disagreement over the
value of the American model of securities regulation and therefore
has an incentive to use its enforcement authority whenever possible
both to control behavior in the international marketplace and to gain
leverage with foreign regulators.
This Comment will present a less harmonious picture of the
relationship between the SEC and foreign regulators than does Pitt
and Shapiro's view. Part I will briefly discuss the growing inter-
nationalization of the securities markets and will argue that the
convergence of international securities regulation may serve the
interests of the SEC more than those of foreign securities markets
or of investors. Part II will discuss the SEC's response to inter-
nationalization, focusing on its use of persuasion and enforcement
mechanisms to further the SEC's own goals for international
regulation. The Comment condudes by arguing that rather than
pursuing uniformity, the SEC should be more attentive to the lessons
that other regulatory systems may hold for United States securities
regulation.
I. The Growth of International Markets
Cross-border trading of securities has increased dramatically in
the past decade. The market for debt securities of blue chip
corporations is truly international. Well-known U.S. issuers raise
debt capital with ease in the relatively unregulated Eurodollar
market,' and major foreign corporations that are willing to bear the
5. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 216-17, 242-43.
6. The U.S. dollar-equivalent amount of capital raised in the Eurobond market rose
from $18.8 billion in 1980 to $175.6 billion in 1988. See The Euromarket in Figures, 1963-
1989, EUROMONEY, June 1989, at 163, 166. Three years ago the Director of the SEC's
Division of Market Regulation noted that "with respect to primary offerings there is a
genuine international market in debt. For the major United States foreign corporations it
is a matter of indifference to them where they raise their money with respect to debt."
Ketchum, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Regulating International Securities
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expense of compliance with the U.S. securities laws7 can tap the vast
resources of the U.S. capital markets as well as other external
markets. International equity trading has also expanded greatly. Both
the purchase of U.S. equity securities by foreigners and the purchase
of foreign equities by U.S. buyers have increased by approximately
a factor of twenty over the last ten years.'
It is important to note that this growth did not come about
through foreign regulators abandoning their own regulatory systems
in favor of the American model and consequently reaping the
benefits of increased investor confidence. Different countries maintain
very different standards of accounting, disclosure, and market
regulation. Furthermore, the principal regulators themselves vary,
and include central banks, stock exchanges, self-regulatory organiza-
tions, and specialized agencies such as the SEC. The United States
maintains securities regulations that are generally stricter and more
vigorously enforced than the securities laws of other major markets.9
The most plausible explanation for the failure of the major
securities markets to adopt regulations patterned on the American
model is that investors have not demanded them as a precondition
of committing funds, even as internationalization has increased the
number of competitors for investors' capital.'" The Eurobond market
Trading: Looking to the Future, 4 B.U. INTeL L.J. 3, 33 (1986).
7. The SEC has adopted forms specifically for use by foreign private registrants who
wish to engage in public offerings of debt or equity securities in the United States. See
generally Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984-
85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,743 (February 28, 1985). Foreign issuers
nevertheless face a formidable and costly task in attempting to comply with the U.S.
securities laws, which not only impose accounting and other disclosure requirements that
may differ considerably from those in the issuer's home market, but also may prohibit or
interfere with normal trading practices in the home market. See, e.g., Banco de Santander,
SA, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,523
(July 28, 1987) (normal market-making as practiced in the Spanish market conflicts with
SEC regulations applicable to primary securities offerings); British Petroleum Co. p.l.c., SEC
No-Action Letter, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,660 (Oct. 13,
1987) (normal underwriting practice in the United Kingdom conflicts with SEC regulations
applicable to primary securities offerings).
8. Levine & Callott, The SEC and Foreign Policy: The International Securities Enforcement
Cooperation Act of 1988, 17 SEc. REG. L.J. 115, 118 (1989).
9. See Spencer, The Reaction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets: Three Concept Releases, 4 B.U. IiN"YL L.J. 111, 114
(1986).
10. See Karmel, Can Regulators of International Capital Markets Strike a Balance Between
Competing Interests?, 4 B.U. IN1rL L.J. 105, 105 (1986) ("International securities markets have
grown to be as large and vibi ant as they are in part because the participants in those
markets are not interested in regulation"). It is only fair to point out that, in Professor
Karmel's view, investor confidence will not be maintained in the long run without effective
regulation.
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is instructive. It developed precisely in order to avoid regulation
and taxation." Changes in the United States tax code, however, have
diminished the tax advantages for foreigners of investing in a
Eurobond as opposed to a security of the same company issued in
the United States." The yields on Eurobonds have generally been
less than the yields on comparable SEC-registered securities, but the
difference is decreasing as the tax differentials erode." All other
things being equal, however, investors in Eurobonds should demand
a greater yield to compensate for the lack of SEC registration if
those investors believe that registration benefits them. While it is still
not quite possible to conclude that all other things are equal, the
evidence available from the Eurobond market at least suggests that
investors do not attach any significant value to SEC registration.
Perhaps even more interesting is the willingness of U.S. investors
to withdraw money from the U.S. market to invest in the Tokyo
stock market, 4 which has long been noted for extremely lax
enforcement of insider trading laws.'5 It is seductively easy to
respond that investors are willing to accept the risks posed by insider
trading in search of the high returns offered by the Tokyo market.
Nevertheless, if rampant insider trading destroys investor confidence,
then Tokyo investors should be a demoralized lot. It is difficult to
explain the level of enthusiasm evident in the Tokyo market's rise
without assuming either that these investors cannot rationally
evaluate the losses they suffer as a consequence of insider trading or
that they do not perceive such losses to be significant.
6
11. See The Unspoken Question: Eurobond Market, Is This Goodbye?, EUROMONEY, Sept.
1989, at 38.
12. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 repealed the withholding tax on foreign individuals
and corporations, thus making it possible for such persons to purchase securities issued in
the United States without payment of the 30% withholding tax on income not connected
with a U.S. business. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 648 (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. § 871(h) (1982 and Supp. V 1987) (repeal of withholding tax on individuals);
id. § 127(b), 98 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 881(c) (1982 and Supp. V
1987) (repeal of withholding tax on corporations).
13. See The Unspoken Question, supra note 11, at 38-39.
14. The SEC recently noted that purchases and sales of Japanese corporate equities
by U.S. investors increased from $12 billion in 1985 to approximately $64 billion in 1989.
See SEC, Japan Say Talks Should Begin on Possible Brokerage Data Exchange, 22 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 92, 93 (1989).
15. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
16. Long-term investors might actually prefer the absence of a ban on insider trading.
Critics of insider trading regulation have argued that permitting corporate insiders to profit
from nonpublic information causes nonpublic information to be reflected promptly in the
stock price to the ultimate benefit of investors, and that it constitutes an efficient means of
compensating enterpreneurs. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOcK MARKET
(1966). Others have argued that, at a minimum, insider trading does not differ suffici-
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If the explosion in cross-border investment in the past decade
did not result from the adoption of stricter securities regulation in
the world's major financial markets, there must be factors other than
the presence of comprehensive regulation that are of greater
importance to investors as they decide where to commit capital. One
factor is the sheer expansion of investment opportunities in other
markets. As the economies, and consequently the securities markets,
of other nations have grown, the highly-regulated U.S. market no
longer holds the commanding lead in investment opportunities that
it once maintained. In 1970, the U.S. stock market accounted for
roughly two-thirds of the aggregate value of the stocks traded on the
world's major exchanges. 7 However, by September 30, 1989, it
accounted for less than one-third of the world market, and was less
than three-quarters the size of the Tokyo stock market.' Investors
generally seek to diversify their portfolios to the extent necessary to
protect against firm, industry, and market specific risks. As the U.S.
market comprises an ever smaller percentage of the securities
available for investment, an investor seeking to maximize effective
portfolio diversification must do so with securities from other
markets.
Another factor contributing to internationalization is the advance-
ments in the mechanics of execution and settlement; that is, the
process by which contracts for the sale of securities are created and
performed. The major securities markets have devoted considerable
attention to automating and streamlining the process by which title
to a security is transferred from the seller to the buyer. An entire
industry has sprung up to provide securities safekeeping, settlement,
and reporting services to institutional investors."0 These seemingly
ently from other stockholder-management issues that it should be the subject of federal
regulation as opposed to contracting between stockholders and managers. See Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983). Short-term investors
such as arbitrageurs, on the other hand, may benefit from a ban on insider trading. See
infra note 51.
17. Shopkorn, Global Trading: The Current and Future Impact on United States Markets and
United States Portfolio Managers, 4 B.U. IN1r'L L.J. 25, 25 (1986).
18. DAIwA INST. OF RESEARCH LTD., World Stock Markets (As of end September 1989),
TOKYO STOcK MARKET QUARTmRLY REViEW, Sept. 30, 1989 at 6. The comparisons are
made in dollar terms. It is also instructive to note that the volatility of the Tokyo stock
market, measured by taking the standard deviation of the monthly return in local currency
over a five-year period. is lower than that of the Standard & Poor's 500. Id.
19. See generally Comment, International Securities Trading: The United States and Great
Britain Develop Clearing and Settlement Procedures for a New Age, 19 CAL. W. Ir'L L.J. 129
(1988); Curing a Bad Name, Fin. Times (U.IL), Feb. 20, 1989, § 3, at 9, col. 1.
20. See Global Custody and Settlement: A Ball for Cinderella, Fin. Times (U.K.), Feb. 20,
1989, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
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mundane developments have been critical in attracting new investors
to the affected markets.2' In addition, regulatory developments
outside the securities field, such as the relaxation of foreign
exchange controls and tax reforms, have facilitated the movement of
investors' funds across national borders.
22
Internationalization of securities trading and the contributing
factors noted above should teach two lessons. First, investors view
such criteria as the size and liquidity of a market, and the sophistica-
tion of execution and settlement systems, as important when deciding
where to commit funds. Second, investors in the aggregate do not
demand market regulation patterned on the American model when
deciding where to commit funds. To its credit, the SEC has taken
note of the first point and has devoted substantial attention to
execution and settlement procedures in the United States as well as
in foreign markets.2 ' The SEC does not appear to have accepted the
second point.
II. The SEC's Response to Internationalization
Internationalization poses a troublesome dilemma for the SEC.
As the world's securities markets directly compete for capital,
investors appear increasingly willing to invest in markets that, from
the SEC's point of view, offer inadequate protection. One possible
response, of course, would be for the SEC to welcome the existence
of a variety of regulatory systems, confident that competition for
capital will cause those systems to flourish that offer the optimal mix
of safeguards to the investing public.2" The risk, of course, is that
over time the American model may be found to be less beneficial to
investors and issuers than competing systems. Such a result would
surely be a blow to an institution that is, by virtue of its excellent
reputation and personnel, and the breadth of its legislative mandate,
widely regarded (certainly by itself) as uniquely qualified to decide
21. See, e.g., id. at 1, col. I ("Without [global custody], the explosion since 1980 of
cross-border investment by pension funds and institutions could not have happened").
22. See Facilitim of Multinational Securities Offerings, supra note 7, at 87,319.
23. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,759, at 87.390 (Apr. 18, 1985) ("[A]s the trend toward international
trading increases, it will become increasingly important for foreign trading markets to
establish efficient, safe and accurate comparison, clearance, and settlement systems . . .").
Unfortunately, however, the SEC appears to view the creation of efficient systems as
principally a regulatory problem. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
24. At least one former SEC official has acknowledged the validity of this view. See
Spencer, supra note 9. at 116.
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questions of investor protection."' The SEC's response to globalization
.accordingly shows a determination to curtail competition among
regulatory schemes.
The prospect of international competition for capital is strongly
reminiscent of the competition for corporate charters in the United
States that has been won, for the time being at least, by Delaware."6
The notion that Delaware had prevailed in a "race for the bottom""
led to calls for minimum federal standards for corporate law,"8
federal chartering of public companies,"9 or a uniform state law
containing various new corporate governance provisions.' Similarly
the SEC has advocated coordination, if not uniformity, of disclosure
and market regulation among the principal international securities
markets. As in the corporate law context, such a move to uniformity
ignores the benefits of competition among regulatory structures.
25. See infra text accompanying note 35. The SEC is empowered by various provisions
of the federal securities laws to promulgate regulations that are "necessary or appropriate
... for the protection of investors." See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 10(a)(4), as amended,
15 U.S.C. I 77j(a)(4) (1988). The SEC's releases, no-action letters, and other pronounce-
ments accordingly are filled with conclusory assertions as to what will or will not benefit
investors or the capital markets generally. See, e.g., Proprosal of Comprehensive Revision to System
For Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902,
41,904-05 (Aug. 18, 1981) ("widely followed" registrants may omit certain information from
prospectuses "without the loss of investor protection"); Interpretative Release Relating to Going
Private Transactions Under Rule 13e-3, Exchange Act Release No. 17719, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 23,709, at 17,304 (Apr. 13, 1981) (going private transactions may result in a "loss
of confidence in the securities markets").
26. The prevalence of Delaware as a domicile for publicly-held corporations led to
claims that Delaware, in an attempt to capture incorporation fees and other economic
benefits, had adopted regrettably lax rules that permitted corporate managers to take
advantage of shareholders. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Others responded that competition among states will produce
optimal, rather than inadequate, rules as investors commit their capital to firms that provide
them with the highest returns and firms incorporate in states whose rules enable them to
maximize those returns. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theoy of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
27. Cary. supra note 26, at 666. The term was intended to describe the competition
in adopting lax rules so as to attract corporate charters.
28. Cary, supra note 26, at 700.
29. See IL NADER, M. GiEEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITuIfONALIZING THE CORPORA-
nON: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTFUNG OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976).
30. See generally Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing. The American Law Institute Principles
of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325 (1987).
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A. The SEC's Policy Statement on Internationalization
The recent SEC Policy Statement on Regulation of International
Securities Markets (Policy Statement),"' while claiming to recognize
"cultural differences,"32 states that the SEC's goal is to "minimize
differences between systems."" The Policy Statement displays no
reticence in declaring which system should be adopted as the model.
It states:
An effective regulatory structure for an international
securities market system would include the following features:
(1) Effwient structures for quotation, price, and volume
information dissemination, order routing, order execution,
clearance, settlement, and payment as well as strong capital
adequacy standards;
(2) Sound disclosure systems, including accounting principles,
auditing standards, auditor independence standards, registra-
tion and prospectus provisions, and listing standards that
provide investor protection yet balance costs and benefits for
market participants; and
(3) Fair and honest markets, achieved through regulation of
abusive sales practices, prohibitions against fraudulent conduct,
and high levels of enforcement cooperation. 4
The Policy Statement further notes that "[t]he United States Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission believes it has a responsibility to
assume a leadership role in international securities regulation. [The
SEC] considers the principles and goals contained in this Policy
Statement to be central to achieving a truly global market system."' ,
Whatever else one may say about the SEC's desire to see other
countries adopt U.S.-style securities regulation, the policy has at least
31. Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of
International Securities MarAets, Securities Act Release No. 6807, [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,341 (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
32. Id. at 89,576.
33. Id.; see also id. at 89,578.
34. Id. at 89,576.
35. Id.
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received support in academic"6 and Congressional" circles in the
United States. The reception abroad, however, has been less
enthusiastic. Regulators"5 and practitioners" in foreign markets, not
surprisingly, defend their own regulatory systems. The SEC's stated
desire to facilitate multijurisdictional securities offerings through
coordinated disclosure requirements has been insufficient to induce
any other country to implement a mandatory disclosure system that
is satisfactory to the SEC. Instead, the pace of multijurisdictional
securities offerings and tender offers has been set by the SEC's
36. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 10, at 106.
37. See S. RP. No. 155, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989) ("The Committee would
... warn against the dangers of a 'competition in laxity' as regulators attempt to shape
their laws to create regulatory climates most favorable for competition"). The SEC's new
chairman appears also to be wary of competition among regulatory schemes. See Breeden,
Response to Questions from Senate Banking Committee in Connection with Confirmation Proceedings
for Richard C. Breeden as a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Sept. 29,
1989, at 8 (exchange between Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Richard C. Breeden on
how "committed American leadership" can help avoid a "race to the bottom" in securities
regulation).
38. The 1989 annual conference of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), an institution formed to further international cooperation, was
marked by the reluctance of participants to "alter[] key aspects of their regulatory schemes."
Harmony and Wariness Coexist at JOSCO's Conference in Venice, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 20, at 1 (Sept. 27, 1989); see also Convergence, More than Harmonization, is Key Word in
Cautious Working Group Sessions, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 8 (Sept. 27, 1989):
In [a session of the IOSCO conference], most of the panel members talked more
about respecting individual markets than about harmonization. German Stock
Exchange Federation executive vice-president Ruediger von Rosen made the
obligatory bow to "a certain degree of harmonization," but emphasized that "value
should be attached to the possibility of giving issuers and investors a choice
between quite different rules and regulations."
39. See Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking Law of the WorldF, 1 J. COMP. CORP.
L. & SEc. R G. 39, 39-40 (1978) ("Europeans do not believe that full disclosure helps [inve-
stors]... . They rather place emphasis on the functioning of competition in the capital
markets, on professional control by banks and investment advisers and, finally, on the
general criminal provisions").
40. Although the SEC requested comments in 1985 on proposed methods of
facilitating multijurisdictional primary offerings of securities, Securities Act Release No. 6568,
supra note 7, and has more recently proposed for comment a series of rules and forms
that would permit certain Canadian issuers to register offerings of securities in the United
States using disclosure documents prepared in accordance with Canadian laws and
regulations, Mulkjurisdictional Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6841, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC.H) 84,432 (July 26, 1989), there does not currently exist
any foreign jurisdiction that has registration and disclosure requirements that are sufficient,
in the SEC's view, to permit a primary offering in the United States by means of a
prospectus prepared in accordance with local law.
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willingness to grant case-by-case exemptive relief.4' These exemptions
are simply a form of administrative largesse that apply only to the
case at hand and do not represent a concession by the SEC or by
any foreign regulatory body that the regulations of either agency
should be changed to facilitate cross-border investment.
B. Insider rading
Insider trading was one of the SEC's principal regulatory and
enforcement focuses during the 1980s,4 and the SEC's extension of
that focus to the international markets was more strident and less
flexible than its initiatives on multinational securities offerings. The
SEC's attempts to convince foreign regulators of the benefits of strict
insider trading laws should take on increasing significance as the
globalization of securities trading progresses. The SEC has long
viewed the absence of extensive insider trading as a sine qua non of
investor confidence. Were internationalization to produce any
substantial evidence that investors in the aggregate are not overly
concerned with insider trading, the theoretical underpinnings of a
vast regulatory and enforcement history would be threatened.
Moreover, as the SEC has achieved success in its effort to expand
the concept of insider trading beyond the trading on material
nonpublic information by corporate officers and directors,4 it has
brought within the purview of U.S. law a variety of actors and
conduct that may exceed the effective reach of its investigatory and
enforcement methods. 5 Thus, the SEC's continued ability to assert
41. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 27,425 (November 7, 1989) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, secrel file) (granting exemptive relief from certain tender offer regulations with
respect to Ford Motor Company p.l.c. tender offer for Jaguar p.l.c.); British Petroleum Co.,
supra note 7 (granting limited exemption from Exchange Act Rules lOb-6 and 10b-7 with
respect to offering of British Petroleum shares in United States).
It is worth noting that the SEC often uses these exemptive applications as a lever to
obtain undertakings from foreign nationals that extend beyond the subject matter of the
application. See, e.g., id. at 77,835 (exemption conditioned upon agreement of each member
of underwriting syndicate to make information, not limited to information concerning the
British Petroleum offering, available to SEC pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding).
42. See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 199-200.
43. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 7088 (June 4, 1963).
44. See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 206-07.
45. The partial success of the "misappropriation theory" in United States v. Carpenter,
484 U.S. 19 (1987), opens the door to prosecution, for example, of a foreign national who
misappropriates information in a foreign country and subsequently uses the information to
trade, or to tip someone who trades, on a U.S. securities market. See, e.g., SEC v.
Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In order to maintain the integrity of the
misappropriation theory, the SEC must necessarily seek out and prosecute such persons;
however, they are not readily subject to investigation and prosecution absent foreign
314
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the primacy of its views on market regulation, and to defend and
expand upon the successes of those views in the U.S. courts, would
be furthered by foreign countries adopting the American model of
insider trading prohibition. The SEC has brought considerable
pressure to bear on foreign countries and their citizens in an
attempt to achieve that result." While the SEC's legal actions have
been styled simply as attempts to gather information from foreigners
for use in policing U.S. insider trading laws, 47 the SEC has been in
effect asking foreign governments to subordinate their own policies,
such as bank secrecy laws, to an international crackdown on insider
trading." Although these attempts have generated criticism,4" the
SEC's ability to use its enforcement power to impose costs on foreign
actors has generated more success in harmonizing regulatory
approaches with respect to insider trading than in any other field.
Pitt and Shapiro implicitly adopt the prevalent view that other
countries, with the SEC's guidance, are coming to realize the benefits
of strict insider trading prohibitions as these countries seek to inspire
confidence in their markets and attract foreign capital."0 Despite the
simple appeal of this view, I believe it is not entirely logical. Most
obviously, while this argument could potentially explain a global
move to stricter insider trading laws followed by a worldwide bull
market and a many-fold increase in cross-border investment, it has
considerably less explanatory power over a fact pattern that is
chronologically reversed.' Moreover, the very magnitude of the
assistance.
This Comment is concerned with the advisability of the SEC's approach to international
securities regulation, not the legal ability of the U.S. government to reach foreign actors
whose conduct has effects within the United States. For a discussion of the latter, see
Brilmayer, The Extrateritorial Application of Anmerican Law: A Methodological and Constitutional
Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1987).
46. See Levine & Callcott, supra note 8, at 120-24 ("[T]he SEC's litigation efforts
showed that it was willing and able to impose significant costs on persons and institutions
from countries that were unwilling to cooperate with U.S. authorities").
47. See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 213-15.
48. This is particularly dear with respect to Switzerland, discussed infra notes 56-63
and accompanying text.
49. See Levine & Callcott, supra note 8, at 123, 145; The SEC's Extra Mile, Wall St. J.
(European ed.), July 15, 1988, at 6, col. I (characterizing the SEC's proposal of the
International Securities Cooperation Act of 1988 as "seizing the mile that it was sure to take
once foreigners began giving the first inch of cooperation").
50. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 212-17; see also The Insider-Trading Dragnet is
Stretching Across the Globe, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1987, at 50.
51. Both Japan and Switzerland adopted stricter insider trading prohibitions in 1988,
see notes 56-73 and accompanying text. Although insider trading has been illegal in the
United Kingdom since 1981, there have been only a handful of prosecutions. See Putting
Insiders Inside, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 18. Even in the United States, as Pitt and
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SEC's efforts concerning multijurisdictional insider trading belies the
conclusion that foreign markets and regulators are providing the
impetus behind the expansion of insider trading prohibitions. A
summary of the SEC's efforts illustrates the point.
1. The United Kingdom
A recent insider trading action involving securities traded on
London's International Stock Exchange (ISE) demonstrates the SEC's
expansion of "regulation by enforcement" to the international arena.
In SEC v. Collier," the SEC brought a civil complaint against an
employee of a U.K. merchant bank who misappropriated informa-
tion concerning two English companies and used the information to
trade in the shares of those companies on the ISE. Unfortunately for
Mr. Collier, who was employed in London, his trades were placed
through a U.S. broker-dealer, and the SEC therefore contended that
Collier had violated Rule lOb-5.5"
As both the challenged conduct and the affected market in the
Collier case were offshore," there was no threat to the fairness or
efficiency of the U.S. securities markets. Rather, Collier represents an
attempt by the SEC to export U.S. insider trading regulation to the
Shapiro point out, the SEC's insider trading enforcement effbrts began to bear highly-
visible fruit only in mid-1986. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 151-52. By June 30,
1986, the Standard & Poors 500 Index had already more than doubled since the beginning
of the decade and the Tokyo Stock Price Index and Financial Times Index each had almost
tripled. See DAIWA SECURITIES RESLARCH INST., ToKYO STOCK MARKET QUARTERLY
REVIEW, June 30, 1986. The same period witnessed unprecedented growth in cross-border
investment. See Ketels, An Overview of International Trading, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 11 (1986).
The adoption of insider trading prohibitions in mature markets is, however, consistent
with the view that securities professionals are the principal beneficiaries of strict insider
trading rules. Large and mature markets provide the major securities firms with numerous
opportunities for risk arbitrage in connection with takeovers and restructurings. Because risk
arbitrageurs seek to profit from uncertainty, they will in general dislike insider trading
precisely because it causes information to be more promptly reflected in the stock price and
therefore reduces uncertainty. See generally Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider
Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1449, 1458-59, 1463 (1986).
52. Litigation Release No. 11817, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 93,925 (C.D. Cal. filed July 26, 1988).
53. 17 C.F.R. I 240.10b-5 (1989). Collier admitted the allegations against him and
consented to the entry of a permanent injunction. See Sturc & Kramer, Federal Enforcement
Initiatives and Insider Trading Law Since United States v. Carpenter, in PRACTICING LAw INST.,
SEC. ENFORCEMENT INST. 293, 319-20 (1989).
54. Both of the companies involved were English and all of Collier's trading
occurred on the ISE. Shares of one of the companies, Cadbury-Schweppes p.l.c., were
quoted in the United States through the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System; the other, Associated Engineering p.lc., was neither listed on
an exchange nor quoted on an inter-dealer system in the United States.
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London market through an enforcement action." The SEC, while
lacking regulatory authority in foreign jurisdictions, appears willing
to use its enforcement authority to alter standards of conduct in
foreign markets.
2. Switzer/and
The SEC's ability to use enforcement actions to regulate insider
trading in European markets could be hampered by the existence of
bank secrecy laws, particularly in Switzerland, which has a tradition
of stringent bank secrecy laws." The conflict between Swiss law and
the SEC's insider trading program led the SEC to mount an
aggressive, and ultimately successful, campaign to persuade the Swiss
government to bring its insider trading legislation into line with U.S.
law as interpreted by the SEC. 7
The Swiss insider trading law" represents a triumph of SEC
pressure through persuasion and enforcement. Often frustrated or
delayed in its attempts to obtain information within Swiss jurisdiction
because of the "dual criminality" requirement. of the U.SJSwiss
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters," the SEC had
attempted unilateral action through the U.S. courts"0 as well as a
55. The United Kingdom, like Japan, is frequently criticized for the laxity of its
insider trading enforcement. See Puls Insiders Inside, supra note 51.
56. Levine & Callcott, supra note 8,- at 124.
57. See West Germany Plans Tghter Insider Trading Rules, Reuter Bus. Rep., Aug. 2. 1988
(BC Cycle) ("The United States recently pressured Switzerland into enacting insider trading
laws after a series of cases in which it was denied access to Swiss bank records").
58. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Code penal suisse, Codice penale Svizzero Art.
161 (Switz.) (Penal Code) (effective July 1, 1988) [hereinafter Article 161].
59. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland. 27 U.S.T. 2019. The Treaty generally provides for mutual assistance in the
investigation of matters that are criminal in both countries. Although Swiss laws protecting
trade secrets may have made it illegal for an insider to tip material information to others,
prior to the enactment of Article 161 there was no specific prohibition in Swiss law against
the use of material nonpublic information by insiders. See Swiss Supreme Court Opinion
Concerning Judicial Assistance in the Santa Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983).
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,346 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For a description, written by an SEC official who
played a significant role in the effort, of the SEC's attempts to procure information from
Swiss banks despite the refusal of Swiss courts to compel production under the Treaty on
Mututal Assistance, see Mann & Mari, Devlopments in Intrnational Securities Law Enforcement.
in PRACTISING LAW INST., SEC. ENFORCEMENT INST. 615, 636-46 (1989). For a more
colorful history, see The Long Arm of the SEC, Am. Law., June 1988, at 119, 120-21
(describing the SEC's "bludgeon approach" in dealing with Switzerland and quoting a
former assistant U.S. attorney as stating that the Swiss "were ready to go to war, at least
with the Southern District [of New York], if not with the United States") (bracketed
language in original).
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Memorandum of Understanding with the Swiss government and the
Swiss Bankers' Association specifically dealing with insider trading"'
to obtain evidence relevant to insider trading investigations. At the
same time, however, the SEC directed its efforts to convincing the
Swiss government to enact insider trading legislation that would
parallel the U.S. approach and thereby remove the dual criminality
obstacle.
That the SEC is the principal beneficiary of Article 161 cannot be
seriously disputed. While the Swiss government and local commen-
tators have understandably avoided direct acknowledgment of this
fact, a commentary on the new law by a practitioner and academic
who was involved in its creation gives considerable prominence to
the tensions between U.S. enforcement efforts and Swiss law in
discussing the background of Article 161. More importantly, the
value of Article 161 to Swiss markets is minimal. As Switzerland lacks
a separate securities law or securities regulatory agency, the new
insider trading law is unaccompanied by the type of information-
gathering and monitoring resources that would be necessary for
enforcement. Because the law is responsive to the needs of the SEC
and not to any articulated local need, the Swiss are not likely to
create such resources. Indeed, Article 161 is frequently referred to
in Swiss legal circles as the "lex Americana."" The law provides the
SEC with a double victory: it can claim that yet another country has
recognized the good sense of having insider trading laws like those
of the United States, and it provides an enforcement lever that may
be used to export U.S. insider trading law to still other jurisdictions.
3. Japan
Japan presents perhaps the greatest obstacle to uniformity in
insider trading law. Although Japan's securities laws were created
just after World War II and are based on the American model, 64
the Japanese securities market has developed a very different set of
practices and norms than the U.S. market. One divergence between
61. Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, Aug. 31, 1982, United
States-Switzerland, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983).
62. P. FORSTMOSER, DAS NEUE SCHWEIZERISCHE INSIDER-R.cHT ("The New Swiss
Insider Law") 17-20 (1988).
63. Cf. id. at 3, 31 (arguing that Article 161 is not solely a "lex Americana").
64. JAPAN SECURrIs RSEARCH INST., ScuRTiES MARKETS IN JAPAN 212 (1988).
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the two systems is Japan's virtual indifference to insider trading.65
Indeed, one difficulty faced by would-be reformers of the Japanese
market is the widespread participation of politicians in insider
trading,6 a practice that will presumably impede any strong
crackdown by the Japanese government.
The existence of rampant insider trading in the world's largest
stock market dearly disturbs the SEC, which has been a persistent
and vocal critic of Japan's relaxed attitude. 7 The SEC has used
newly-established regular meetings between its staff and Japan's
Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a forum to seek cooperation on
insider trading.' When the MOF responded to American pressure
by proposing stricter insider trading legislation, Chairman Ruder
traveled to Tokyo during the drafting process and pronounced the
result satisfactory." The legislation was passed by the Diet in
May 1988.70
While on the surface the SEC has won a significant victory in
the passage of the Japanese legislation, the game may be far from
over. Market participants and regulators in Japan do not appear to
view insider trading as a "problem" to the extent that the SEC
does.71 While some critics believe that the Japanese will become more
concerned with insider trading as their market matures, others
contend that the mores of the Japanese market reflect Japanese
culture and are unlikely to change even under the influence of
increased foreign participation.72
Perhaps recognizing that cooperation in securities regulation must
share the stage with a variety of contentious trade and financial
issues between the U.S. and Japanese governments, the SEC has
relied principally on verbal criticism in its attempts to alter Japanese
market practices. If criticism is unavailing, however, the SEC may be
65. See Insider Trading in Japan: So Many Misunderstandings, Th E ECONOMIST. Oct. 10,
1987, at 78; Japan's Different Stock Market, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1987, at Dl, col. 3; see
generally Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1989).
66. See Japan Moving to Sten Flow, United Press Int'l, Mar. 28, 1988 (BC Cycle);
Money Flows Freely in Tokyo Politics, United Press Int'l, Feb. 22, 1988 (BC Cycle).
67. Whitener, Japan Tackles Insider Trading, INT4L FIN. L. REv. 15, 15 (June 1988).
68. See Japan, U.S. Officials to Discuss Insider Trading. Kyodo News Serv., Oct. 12, 1987.
69. New Japanese Insider Trading Law Likely to Take Effect in Early 1989, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) (June 6, 1988).
70. Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, supra note 65, at 1303.
71. See Whitener, supra note 67, at 15 ("Trading on insider information is viewed by
many Japanese investors as a legitimate, even necessary, basis for stock market invest-
ments"); see also Japanese Insider Trading: New Laws for Old, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1988,
at 92.
72. See Japan's Different Stock Market, supra note 65.
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tempted to use other forms of pressure, and the extensive participa-
tion of Japanese institutions in the U.S. market will offer ample
opportunities to export regulation by enforcement. Therein lies a
significant opportunity for friction between the SEC and the
Japanese government that could expose the weak foundations of
harmony in international securities regulation.
Conclusion
The SEC has responded to internationalization of the securities
markets with calls for uniformity in securities regulation, a unifor-
mity that is to be based on the American model. Internationalization
has also provided the SEC with opportunities to use its enforcement
powers as a lever to press for greater cooperation and uniformity
among the world's securities regulators. As foreign markets grow and
attract a greater share of worldwide investment, the SEC's desire to
maintain the primacy of the American model of securities regulation
may lead to an increase in the SEC's efforts to export regulation,
resulting in greater friction between the SEC and foreign regulators.
The issue for the 1990s, however, should not merely be whether
the SEC should take a more or less confrontational approach to
international securities regulation, but whether there is any value in
the deliberate convergence of regulatory approaches in the first
place. This Comment has argued that there is not, and from that
argument a number of condusions follow. First, the SEC should
abandon its calls for international uniformity in securities regulation.
As the Policy Statement on Regulation of International Securities
Markets makes clear, the SEC considers the American model of
securities regulation to represent a vital public policy that the United
States should not abandon even in order to facilitate global markets.
It is simply arrogant not to attach the same importance to other
nations' regulatory policies. Even when the absence of uniform
regulation can impede the full achievement of the SEC's domestic
regulatory goals, as with respect to insider trading, other countries'
regulatory practices should be recognized as important. Finally, and
perhaps most important in the long run, the SEC, as well as the
Congress, should closely observe the securities markets and regula-
tions of other countries and critically compare our system to others.
Such a comparison might ultimately induce a reappraisal of the
American model of securities regulation.
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